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Abstract
The national development of the ethnic groups of the Habsburg Monarchy were 
influenced by the policies undertaken toward them by their rulers, the Austrian Germans 
and, after 1867, the Magyars of Hungary.  Contrasts can be identified between those 
groups living in the Austrian part of the Monarchy and those living in the Kingdom of 
Hungary, a trend that can be identified in the Monarchy's South Slav populations (Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes), as this population inhabited territories on both sides of the dualist 
border.  The present study examines the differences in the nationality policies toward the 
South Slavs on the part of the governments of Cisleithanian Austria and the Kingdom of 
Hungary during the decades prior to the First World War.  The concluding section 
examines how these nationality policies influenced the post-1914 development of the 
South Slav groups.
iii
1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When surveying the conflicts in the Balkan peninsula over the course of the 
twentieth century, up to and including the bloody aftermath of the collapse of Yugoslavia 
in the early 1990s, it is tempting to look for a single cause or point in history responsible 
for these outcomes.  While many of the conflicts among the South Slav peoples (Serbs, 
Croats, Slovenes) long predated the nineteenth century, at least some of the conflicts had 
their genesis in policies undertaken toward them by the Habsburg Monarchy, of which 
the majority of the South Slav territory was a part prior to 1918.  Complicating matters is 
the fact that these territories were divided between the jurisdictions of Austria and 
Hungary.  What were the differences in the nationality policy toward the South Slavs (i.e., 
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) in each half of the Dual Monarchy during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (in the decades immediately prior to the First 
World War)?  What effect did they have on the South Slav population of the Monarchy?  
What impact did these policies have on developments in the Balkan Peninsula in the 
decades since 1918?  The present study intends to examine the history of the Habsburg 
Monarchy in an attempt to trace some of the origins of conflict within the former 
Yugoslavia since the end of the First World War.  Since the conflicts between Croats and 
Serbs, Slovenes and Serbs, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, among others, were expressed in 
ethnic terms, I will explore the relationship between the Southern Slavic ethnicities and 
2 
the impact of Austrian and Hungarian policies on the evolving ethnic identity of the  
various populations inhabiting the South Slav region who were once ruled by the 
Habsburgs. 
Of the three European multinational empires (the Habsburg, Ottoman and 
Russian; i.e., states that lacked an overwhelming majority population of one nationality), 
it is the post-1867 Habsburg empire (also commonly referred to as Austria-Hungary and 
the Dual Monarchy) that presents some unique challenges for historians attempting to 
decipher political conditions in its subject territories.  With the Ausgleich of 1867, the 
state was essentially split in two: the Kingdom of Hungary (the lands of the Crown of St. 
Stephen) gained autonomy over its internal affairs under the control of a Magyar-
dominated Budapest government, while the rest of the Austrian state (also known as 
Cisleithanian Austria)
1
 continued to be ruled from Vienna.  This division meant, in many 
cases, different approaches to the problem of how to deal with the other nationalities of 
the empire, which were marginalized and denied an equal role in government at both the 
local and national level. 
This distinction between Austrian and Hungarian government becomes apparent 
when examining the status of the South Slav lands of the monarchy (territories 
encompassed by the modern day states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
parts of Serbia).  The dividing line between the Vienna and Budapest governments ran 
directly through this area; significant Serbian and Croatian populations existed on both 
                                                 
1 The internal boundary between the Austrian and Hungarian jurisdictions largely followed the Leitha 
River.  For this reason, historians have taken to referring to post-1867 Austria as “Cisleithanian 
Austria,” over its formal title “the kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrat.”  The 
complementary name, “Transleithania,” is much less often used to refer to post-1867 Hungary. 
3 
sides of the internal border.  Faced with similar challenges (especially as the Yugoslav 
movement gained steam at the end of the nineteenth century) the Austrian and Hungarian 
governments at times gave different responses to the nationality problem.   
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Background 
 
Before exploring in detail Austrian and Hungarian nationality policies, it will be 
helpful to provide a brief overview of the complicated historico-political situation of the 
South Slavs in the years following the 1867 Ausgleich.    
Of the three ethnic groups, the Slovenes were the only ones whose population 
resided primarily in the Austrian half of the monarchy (however, according to some 
reports the Kingdom of Hungary at the time of the Ausgleich in 1867 had a Slovene 
population of as much as 45,000).
2
  They constituted a majority of the population in the 
province of Carniola, and made up a significant portion of the population of the territories 
that were southern Styria and Carinthia prior to 1918 (even today, there is a small 
Slovene minority remaining in the southernmost part of the modern day Austrian 
republic).  Slovene nationalists in this province were engaged in a constant struggle for 
equality against the dominant German population. 
The largest concentration of Serbian population in the monarchy was the province 
of Vojvodina in southern Hungary, although significant numbers of Serbs resided in 
Croatia and Dalmatia as well.  Many Serbs in this area worked with the Croats to obtain 
greater autonomy in the form of a separate South Slav state within the monarchy; others  
 
                                                 
2 Fran Zwitter, “The Slovenes and the Habsburg Monarchy,” Austrian History Yearbook (Vol. 3, Part 2, 
1967), 159-188: 159. 
5 
sought union with the neighboring state of Serbia (a trend that intensified dramatically in 
the years leading up to the First World War). 
The situation of the Croats of the Habsburg monarchy represents what is perhaps 
the best example of the issues at hand, as the Croatian people had two main centers in 
which they made up a large part of the population.  On the one hand, they constituted a 
majority of the population of the Kingdom of Croatia, the provinces of Croatia and 
Slavonia, which was part of the Hungarian crownlands.  On the other, Croats claimed the 
province of Dalmatia, which was part of Cisleithanian Austria, and continually demanded 
its union with the rest of Croatia. 
There was, also, a fourth ethnic group residing in this region – the Muslim South 
Slavs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a legacy of the centuries of Ottoman rule.  These were 
descendants of medieval adherents of the Bogumil sect, regarded as heretical by both 
Rome and Byzantium; at the time of the Turkish conquest the population promptly 
converted to Islam.
3
  This group, however, unlike the others, remains largely in the 
background for most of this period, and many of its members identified with the Serbs or 
the Croats.  It would not be until the last decade before the war that Bosnian Muslims 
began to actively assert their own national consciousness, in part for reasons to be 
examined later in this study. 
The issue of language was not be a delineating factor, as by the end of the 
nineteenth century, Serbs and Croats spoke what was essentially the same language.
4
  
                                                 
3 Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), p. 323. 
4 In the early nineteenth century, Croatian authors gravitated toward the štovakian dialect, common to 
both Serbs and Croats, over the more uniquely Croatian kajkavian dialect. By the end of the century, the 
only major linguistic difference between Croat and Serb would be the use of Latin characters over 
6 
Only the Slovenes used their own distinct language, although one that was related to 
Serbo-Croatian.  Religion instead to a strong degree came to be associated with ethnic 
identification in this area, as it still is today.  The Slovenes were Roman Catholic, as were 
the Croats.  Serbs generally adhered to Eastern Orthodoxy, although there were Catholic 
South Slavs who identified themselves as Serbs.
5
  
Relations between the Croats and Serbs alternated between conflict and 
cooperation for the entire period under review.  Staunch nationalists on both sides would 
take turns denying the existence of the other as a separate nationality.  Serbian 
nationalists referred to Croats as “Catholic Serbs”; Croats countered with the charge that  
Serbs were merely “Orthodox Croats.”  Some Croats extended this claim to supremacy 
even further, designating the Slovenes as “Mountain Croats.”6  
What was the political status of the lands in which these peoples lived?  Some of 
these provinces were directly incorporated into the administrative structure of their 
respective states (Austria or Hungary), while others had some form, however limited, of 
autonomous rule. 
An example of the former is the Slovene-inhabited provinces of Carniola, Styria 
and Carinthia.  These lands had been part of the Habsburg inheritance for centuries, and 
had always been ruled in the same manner as the other territories under Vienna's 
administration.  Along with this had come German dominance of provincial and local 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cyrillic ones.  For a review of Croatian language development and its implications, see Bogdan 
Krizman, “The Croatians in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century,” Austrian History 
Yearbook (Vol. 3, Part 2, 1967) 116-158: 118-120. 
5 Ivo Banac, “The Confessional 'Rule' and the Dubrovnik Exception: The Origins of the 'Serb Catholic' 
Circle in Nineteenth Century Dalmatia,” Slavic Review (Vol. 42, No. 3, Autumn 1983) 447-474: 448. 
6 Zwitter, p. 178. 
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government.  Much the same could also be said for the province of Istria, which had also 
long been an Austrian crownland (including the port city of Trieste), with a large Slovene 
population, and significant numbers of Croats and Italians as well. 
Similar conditions existed in the Vojvodina, which was fully incorporated into the 
Kingdom of Hungary, and ruled directly from Budapest.  The province had enjoyed a 
brief period of autonomy from the Hungarian crown in the aftermath of the 1848 
revolutions; however, the Vojvodina was returned to Budapest's control as the Habsburgs 
during the 1860s moved away from attempts to centralize administration from Vienna at 
the expense of the Magyars.  As such, for the post-Ausgleich period, the Vojvodina was 
subject to the full force of the magyarizing policies enacted by the Hungarian 
government, as will be discussed. 
The lands of Croatia and Slavonia, collectively known as the Kingdom of Croatia 
or the “Triune Kingdom,” (Croatia, Slavonia & Dalmatia – the last being claimed as part 
of the kingdom despite being under a different jurisdiction) had been joined to the 
Hungarian crown since the twelfth century.  In 1868, the Croatian state had won, at least 
nominally, significant autonomous rights from the central government in Budapest, 
enshrined in their own Ausgleich, the Nagodba.  In practice, however, many of these 
rights were sharply curtailed, as we will soon examine. 
The province of Dalmatia had been annexed by the Habsburg Monarchy 
following the Napoleonic Wars.  Prior to this, the area had been ruled by Venice for 
several centuries, with the exception of the city of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), which had been 
an independent republic.  The years of Venetian rule had left the province with a 
8 
significant Italian minority among the South Slav majority; the interplay between these 
two groups proved to be a factor in the nationality policy adopted toward this region, as 
we will see. 
The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina have had a tumultuous history since 
1878, the year in which the Congress of Berlin assigned them to Austria-Hungary to 
administer (although they for a time remained nominally under Ottoman suzerainty).  The 
area was administered neither by the Austrian part of the monarchy nor the Hungarian 
government, but rather was governed separately as the responsibility of the state's joint 
Ministry of Finance.  In the aftermath of the Young Turk revolt of 1908, the Habsburg 
monarchy determined to formally annex the territory, setting off what to many observers  
would be the chain reaction leading to the assassination in Sarajevo in 1914, and thus the 
World War. 
In his comprehensive study of the nationality problem in the Habsburg monarchy, 
The Multinational Empire, Robert A. Kann divided his treatment of the nationality groups 
into those with an “independent national history” and those without; many other scholars 
have followed his example.  It is noteworthy that Professor Kann assigned the Croats to 
the former group, while the Slovenes and Serbs were placed in the latter.
7
  However, this 
designation can be somewhat misleading.  It is true that Croatia had been an independent 
state prior to its union with Hungary, and at times Croatian nationalists pressed for its 
continued independence and the interpretation that its tie to Budapest was merely a 
personal union of crowns.  Likewise, it is true that there had never been an independent 
                                                 
7 Robert Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 
1848-1918, 2 vols. (New York: Octagon Books 1964), v. 1, p. 44. 
9 
Slovene state in the modern sense of the term (although the Slovenes did live within 
defined historico-political entities, including a territory in which they constituted a 
majority of the population – the Duchy of Carniola).  However, the designation of the 
Serbs as being without an independent history is definitely misleading, as there was the 
history of a medieval Serbian state, as well as the developing contemporary Serbian one; 
the only difference was that the Serbs did not have a history of independent development 
on territory within the Monarchy.
8
 
A final word regarding classification.  In speaking of national movements, there is 
often the temptation to generalize, as if all members of a group were seeking the same 
goal: e.g., “the Croats pressed for independence.”  In reality, during this period, the 
seeking of nationality rights, particularly among the South Slavs, was limited virtually 
entirely to the intelligentsia, the educated class (to be sure, it was these individuals who 
ultimately set the agenda, and whose narrative is remembered by history).  The vast 
majority of the population was unconcerned with these issues, and did not particularly 
care who ruled them.  Indeed, even to the end of the empire, many remained at least 
passively loyal to the dynasty (Kaisertreue).
9
  Therefore, I will attempt as far as possible 
to make the distinction between South Slav nationalists and the South Slav population at 
large. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Ibid, p. 46.  For Kann's purposes, the brief period of Habsburg control of the Pashalik of Belgrade 
during the early 18
th
 century does not count. 
9 Philip Longworth, The Making of Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan Press 1992), p. 121. 
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Political Conditions in Austria and Hungary 
 
Now I will examine in detail the opportunities and obstacles faced by the South 
Slavs in both parts of the Dual Monarchy.  It has been said by one observer that in the 
years following the Ausgleich, relations between the nationalities in the Austrian half 
became considerably more balanced, in that the Cisleithanian nationalities had a greater 
degree of autonomous rights, relative to those experienced in Hungary.
10
  This 
supposition has been widely believed, not only by modern scholars but also by 
contemporary observers.  For example, a 1915 memorandum from the German secretary 
of state to the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister lamented that Austrian Germans had 
lost predominance of their half of the Monarchy, and the other nationalities had gained 
greater power; the German government then demanded as a condition of continuing the 
alliance that Austria halt its “progressive slavicization” in a manner similar to what its 
Magyar partners had done.
11
  Cisleithanian Austria has gained a reputation for having a 
more liberal nationality policy than Hungary; however, upon closer examination, there is 
more to this story. 
 
                                                 
10 László Katus, Hungary in the Dual Monarchy, 1867-1914, Trans. by Paul Bődy and Andrew T. Gane 
(New York:  Columbia University Press 2008), p. 434. 
11 Stephan Verosta, “The German Concept of Mitteleuropa, 1916-1918 and its Contemporary Critics,” in 
The Habsburg Empire in World War I: Essays on the Intellectual, Military, Political and Economic 
Aspects of the Habsburg War Effort, ed. by Robert A. Kann, et. al., (New York: Columbia University 
Press 1977), pp. 203-220, p. 210. 
11 
In Cisleithanian Austria, there was no blanket attempt made to address the legal 
status of all the non-German nationalities; this was generally done on a province-by-
province basis.  In Hungary, such a comprehensive attempt was made: the Nationalities 
Law of 1868 demarcated rights for all of the non-Magyar nationalities of the kingdom, 
including the right to use their native languages in community, county and church 
assemblies.  However, Magyar was still to be the administrative language of county and 
city government, and the law did not recognize any collective national existence for any 
group other than the Magyars.  Although the law had considerable flaws, it has been 
judged by some historians to be progressive legislation for the time.
12
 
One of the clear indicators of attitudes in Vienna and Budapest toward the 
nationalities was the policies enacted regarding the use of language in their respective 
lands.  Language policies also had the most practical impact on the lives of their citizens, 
as they impacted even those individuals who may have considered themselves outside of 
the political process (i.e., a considerable majority of the population of the Monarchy).  In 
addition, language was the primary criterion used in the Monarchy's censuses to classify 
nationality.  In Cisleithanian Austria, the specific category used for the census was the 
Umgangssprache, the language in daily use; in Hungary it was the Muttersprache, the 
mother tongue.
13
   
 
                                                 
12 Katus, p. 102. Katus' work provides an excellent brief survey of the 1868 law.  To be sure, most of the 
historians giving positive appraisals of the Nationalities Law are Magyar, although the concurring 
opinion of American historian Arthur J. May is cited alongside their own, as Katus does. 
13 Z.A.B. Zeman, Pursued by a Bear: The Making of Eastern Europe (London: Chatto & Windus 1989), p. 
24.  This is to say nothing of bilingualism, which, as Zeman discusses, was quite common in the 
Monarchy (e.g., Slovenes perfectly conversant in German, and vice versa).  The issue of bilingualism in 
the Habsburg Empire itself provides fertile ground for future study. 
12 
In Cisleithanian Austria, the language policy could vary, sometimes considerably, 
depending upon the province.  In addition to the conflict between German centralism and 
the desire for national rights on the part of the population, such factors as the presence of 
other national minorities in the province could impact the adoption of a language policy. 
In the Slovene areas, legislation tended to bring the use of Slovene closer to parity 
with German.  In 1883, a decree of the Ministry of Justice established that those 
bureaucrats who were assigned to Slovene-inhabited areas were expected to have 
familiarity with the Slovene language, or to acquire it within a short time.
14
  However, 
considerable allowances were made as a result of pressure on behalf of the German 
population of this region.  An 1896 decree established that, even in Slovene schools, 
German was to be taught alongside Slovene in instruction.
15
    
The Dalmatian coastline represents a special case, as the language policies 
involved not only the German administrators and the Serb and Croat population, but also 
the Italian minority living in the region as well.  There is a long-standing perception that 
the Austrian government had favored the Italian population of the province at the expense 
of the South Slavs, perhaps owing in part to the long period of Venetian rule in Dalmatia.  
However, a review of the evolution of language policies in Dalmatia tells a different 
story.  Here, legislation gradually improved the status of the Serbo-Croatian language in 
the pre-war decades.  An 1885 regulation mandated that laws published in Italian in 
Dalmatia be translated into Serbo-Croatian, although this was largely for the benefit of 
                                                 
14 Das Österreichische Sprachenrecht ed by Alfred Fischel (Brünn: Fried. Irrgang 1910), p. 224. 
15 Ibid, p. 335. 
13 
personnel in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16
  By 1909, regulations had been 
established for Dalmatia that mandated the use of “the Croatian or Serbian language” for 
most aspects of official business, with the use of Italian being the exception rather than 
the rule.
17
 
Within the Kingdom of Hungary, an attempt was made to provide for a consistent 
language policy.  The non-Magyar nationalities had to contend with laws mandating the 
use of the Magyar language in public life, particularly in schools.  The South Slavs had 
little if any political ability to slow the push toward magyarization, but they did make 
their opinions known.  During the debate in the Hungarian parliament over an 1879 law 
mandating use of Magyar in schools, Mihailo Polit, a Serbian representative, declared 
that the fact that such a law even came before them demonstrated that Hungary was an 
“eastern” country, and compared Hungary's treatment of nationality questions 
unfavorably with western European states, such as Belgium.
18
  Likewise, another Serbian  
representative, Anton Hadzsics, expressed the view that he considered the proposed bill 
as tantamount to an assault on his nationality.
19
 
Due to its legal status as a technically semiautonomous land under the Hungarian 
crown, Croatia was spared the full impact of Budapest's magyarizing policies.  However, 
the Hungarian-appointed government still enacted Magyar-favorable policies.  The 
administration of Ban (governor) Karoly Khuen-Héderváry proved to be particularly 
                                                 
16 Ibid, p. 227. This concern, however, was largely unnecessary, as a review of Bosnian language policy    
     will demonstrate; see below, p. 13. 
17 Ibid, pp. 322-325. 
18 Magyarisirung in Ungarn: Nach dem Debatten des Ungarischen Reichstages über dem obligaten  
     Unterricht der magyarischen Sprache in sämmtlichen Volkschulen (Munich: Theodor Ackerman 1879),  
      pp. 40-46. 
19 Ibid, p. 314. 
14 
hostile to Croatian language policies (as well as other national interests, as will be 
discussed).  Legislation was passed forbidding the use of the Croatian language in the 
railway service.
20
  In addition, Magyar instruction was introduced on a voluntary basis in 
Croatian Gymnasia, and inscriptions in Magyar were to be engraved on government 
buildings in Zagreb.
21
  Another policy mandating the use of Magyar in Croatian railways, 
in 1907, was described by a contemporary observer as a “stab in the heart” for Croatia.22   
The language policies of Bosnia-Herzegovina display what is perhaps the most 
overt attempt to maintain control over the debate in the region.  One of the earliest pieces 
of legislation on the subject, in 1880, established that German was to be the language of 
administration in the provinces.
23
  This predominance of German remained until 1895, 
when a new decree allowed for the use of the local language; however, the use of German 
was still preferred.
24
   
Perhaps the greatest difference with regard to the nationality policy in the two 
areas of the Habsburg realm can be seen with regard to issues of franchise and 
representation.  Cisleithanian Austria progressively increased the franchise in the post-
Ausgleich years, culminating in the electoral reform of 1907, which, in theory, provided 
for universal male suffrage.  In Hungary, however, despite several promising attempts, 
the Magyar ruling class allowed only minimal increases to the franchise, and resisted any 
substantive reform to the very end.  A comparison of how the South Slavs fared under the 
                                                 
20 Rudolf Kiszling, Die Kroaten: Der Schicksalweg eines Südslawenvolkes (Graz: H. Böhlaus Nachf 
1956), p. 68. 
21 Charles Jelavich, “The Croatian Problem in the Habsburg Empire in the Nineteenth Century,” Austrian 
History Yearbook (Vol. 3, Part 2, 1967), 83-115: 106. 
22 Kiszling, Kroaten, p. 77. 
23 Fischel, p. 336. 
24 Ibid, p. 338. 
15 
electoral systems in Austria and Hungary will shed a great deal of light on the question of 
their role in their respective states. 
In 1905, two events occurred that escalated calls for government reforms in the 
Habsburg Monarchy.  The first was the 1905 Russian Revolution and the subsequent 
(however limited) introduction of representative government in that country.  The second 
was what has come to be called the “Crisis of Dualism,” which occurred when a party 
favoring greatly reducing ties to Austria (up to and including independence) won enough 
seats in that year's elections to take control of the parliament of Hungary.  For much of 
the next year, the court refused to allow this party to form a government, and attempted to 
govern through a coalition of the opposition parties friendly to them, setting the stage for 
constitutional clashes.  Ironically, that same year, an event occurred that, almost 
unnoticed at the time, proved to be significant – through the Declaration of Fiume, 
representatives of Serb and Croat delegations determined to work together to establish 
their own state, preferably through the establishment of a third autonomous South Slav  
state within the monarchy (the heralded “trialist” solution), but outside the Monarchy if 
necessary. 
In the aftermath of these events, the government of Cisleithanian Austria 
determined to reform the electoral system and extend the franchise further.  After much 
debate, the resulting 1907 Reform Bill granted de jure universal male suffrage to all 
citizens of Austria.  It also resulted in some realigning of the nationality representation in 
the Reichsrat, yet the reform left Germans largely in control of the chamber.  Historians 
have lamented that the reform ultimately did little to alleviate the nationality problem in 
16 
Cisleithanian Austria.  William Jenks, in his survey of the reform opines that universal 
suffrage temporarily worked because newly enfranchised voters focused on economic 
policies promised by progressive nationalist candidates, but the reform was ultimately 
unable to overcome the fatal flaw in that it did not go far enough in creating federalized 
national states in Austria.
25
  Robert Kann concurs that the failure to carry through with 
additional reforms following the franchise extension contributed to the empire's 
collapse.
26
  It is also true, however, that the reform had precious little time to have an 
effect, before the Reichsrat was dissolved in March 1914 and the war intervened.  It is 
entirely possible that, had Austria been given a few more years of peace, and the 
Reichsrat been called back into session later in 1914, a more apparent beneficial effect of 
universal suffrage on the state's national question may have been felt.  In the brief time 
the reform was in effect, however, we can see what impact it did have on the South Slavs. 
Inhabitants of the Slovene areas saw greater representation in their local and 
regional governments.  For the population of mixed German and Slovene districts, the 
electoral precincts were still gerrymandered to give Germans a disproportionately higher 
representation than their population warranted, however the overall delegation of 
Slovenes still increased after 1907.  For the Duchy of Carniola during the year 1907, the 
officeholders, while mixed German and Slovene, the majority of them had Slavic 
names.
27
  For Croats and Serbs, the representative apportionment was even more heavily 
weighted toward them.  In Dalmatia, the membership roster of the provincial assembly 
                                                 
25 William Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907 (New York: Columbia University Press 1950) p. 
212. 
26 Kann, Multinational Empire, v. 2, p. 227. 
27 Hof und Staats-Handbuch der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie für das Jahr 1907 (Vienna: K.K. 
Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1907), pp. 587-9. 
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(Landtag) for 1907 was almost totally Croat or Serb, with just a handful of Italian 
names.
28
   
With regard to representation in the Reichsrat, it increased slightly for each of the 
South Slav groups, except for the Serbs.  In the 1907 elections, the Slovenes won 23 
seats, the Croats 12, and the Serbs had 2 (the numbers the same for the final prewar 
election, of 1911).
29
  Compare these numbers to the results of the 1901 election, which 
gave the Slovenes 16 seats, the Croats 11, and the Serbs 2.
30
  However, as the total 
number of Reichsrat representatives increased from 425 to 516 between 1901 and 1907, 
the relative size of the total South Slav delegation increased by an even smaller margin 
than these numbers suggest – 6.82% in 1901 and rose to just 7.17% in 1907. 
In Hungary, likewise, the Crisis inspired an attempt at electoral reform.  The 1905 
Reform bill promised to increase the size of the franchise considerably, including 
significant representation by the non-Magyar nationalities.  The press in Croatia hailed 
this development and regarded it as a hopeful sign for the future.
31
  However, 
conservative Magyar politicians ensured that the 1905 reform was never to be enacted.  A 
new reform attempt followed in 1913; in part due to the outbreak of the war, this bill 
likewise never went into effect.  Final wartime attempts to extend the franchise by 
framing the issue as granting suffrage to soldiers and veterans were defeated as a result of 
the opposition of a faction led by Prime Minister Istvan Tisza.
32
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Despite this limited franchise, the South Slavs did play a role in Hungarian 
government.  Their delegates served in the Hungarian parliament during the post-
Ausgleich years, as did other representatives of non-Magyar nationalities, however, as 
electoral districts favored Magyars, their numbers often proved too small to have much 
impact on legislation.  They were, however, numerous enough to have their voices heard, 
as they did during the debate on the 1879 language law.  It is not without justification that 
the Serbs have been referred to as having been politically the “second-most significant 
nationality” in prewar Hungary.33 
Also, one must consider the national assembly of Croatia, the Sabor.  This body, 
composed mostly of Croatian and Serbian representatives, often reduced to a consultative 
or “rubber-stamp” role during this period, nevertheless at times were active participants 
in crafting legislation.  For example, the Sabor in 1873 was able to negotiate minor 
revisions to the Nagodba compromise agreement slightly more in Croatia's favor.
34
  In 
addition, the Sabor served as an outlet for protest against Magyar-supported legislation, 
as when it disapproved of the 1907 act requiring Magyar on Croatian railways.
35
  Such 
appeals rarely yielded concrete action, yet they represented an official channel for the 
Croatian people to make their voice heard.  The existence of a separate Croatian 
parliament, however, could be a double-edged sword.  In his work on the nationality 
issue, Josef Eötvös quotes a speech from a representative in the Hungarian parliament 
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stating the view that as long as Croatia maintained its separate existence and assembly, it 
should not be represented in the national Hungarian parliament.
36
  However, the Croats 
ultimately would be guaranteed representation in the Budapest parliament through the 
terms of the Nagodba. 
Much of this unequal partnership between the Hungarian government and Croatia 
stretched back for centuries, but it was largely solidified in the document known as the 
Nagodba, sometimes referred to as a “subdualism” formalized between the two in 1868.  
Through it, the Hungarian government recognized the Triune Kingdom of Croatia as an 
autonomous entity within the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen, and the right to utilize 
the Croatian language in its own administration.  In addition, it promised to aid in efforts 
to unify Dalmatia to the rest of Croatia when the situation was favorable to do so.  
However, the agreement placed the Ban (royal governor) as well as Croatia's finances 
under the control of the Hungarian government, and transferred control of the port city of 
Fiume away from Croatia.  The agreement was lambasted by Croatian nationalists as a 
disaster for their cause; however, some have argued that its terms were not as unfavorable 
for the Croatian people as have been presented and were, in any event, as good as they 
were likely to get.
37
   
Nonetheless, it was also the case that representatives of the Croatian political 
parties could and were given a place at the table on equal terms by members of the 
Habsburg court, Austrian officials, and (at times) members of the Hungarian government 
as well.  One such case occurred immediately prior to the annexation of Bosnia-
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Herzegovina.  In April 1908, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chief of the Austro-
Hungarian General Staff, made a promise to Josip Frank, the leader of the Croatian Party 
of Pure Rights, that, following the annexation, the provinces would be attached to 
Croatia.
38
  In this way Croatian support for the annexation was obtained.  Nor was this a 
singular incident; in his memoirs, Conrad provides a December 1907 letter from Dr. 
Frank in which the latter declares his loyalty to the Monarchy and in a veiled manner asks 
for help against the Magyars, a kind of quid quo pro.
39
 
Yet another organ of South Slav representation could be found in the provinces of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Following the occupation of the provinces after the Congress of 
Berlin in 1878, the area was placed under the direct administration of the joint Austro-
Hungarian Ministry of Finance.  For much of this period the local population had little 
input into their government.  In the aftermath of the formal annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1908, the decision was made to establish a regional representative 
assembly for the area.  When this body was convened in 1910, however, according to 
some historians it was largely denied any executive powers, and served primarily as a 
consultative assembly.
40
  In contrast, others have maintained that this assembly had more 
relative authority than the Sabor in Zagreb had.
41
  In view of these diverging opinions, 
one must consider, in Alois Czedik's chronicle of Austrian ministerial history, his account 
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of an ambitious work plan for the Bosnian assembly for 1911, an agenda that included the 
establishment of a 1912 budget, and appointment of education, agricultural and railway 
advisors.
42
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Alois Freiherr von Czedik, Zur Geschichte der k.k. österreichischen Ministerien, 1861-1916,  4 vols 
(Teschen: Prochaska 1920), v. 4, p. 382. 
22 
 
 
Economic Issues 
 
A difference can also be discerned in the attention the respective governments of 
Austria and Hungary gave to their South Slav provinces concerning economic issues.  
Generally, in the Austrian part of the monarchy, there appears to have been some attempt 
to identify and address economic problems in specific provinces, even if these attempts 
did not always bear fruit.  The Hungarian government, on the other hand, largely 
attempted to deal with the economy of the kingdom as a whole, with less attention being 
given its composite territories. 
As was the case for the population of much of the Dual Monarchy, traditionally, 
the great majority of Slovenes were engaged in agriculture.  But within the first decade of 
the twentieth century, the percentage of the Slovene population engaged in agriculture 
fell by a larger margin than among any of the other Austrian language groups.
43
  It was 
not necessarily the case, however, that industrial development of the provinces kept pace 
with this population shift, or that the Slovene laborers were able to take advantage of the 
existing industrial infrastructure to ensure ample employment or the opportunity to invest 
in capital themselves.  In Carinthia and Carniola, industry was almost entirely in German 
hands.
44
  Toward the end of the nineteenth century, laborers were often compelled to 
                                                 
43 Janko Pleterski, “Die Slowenen,” in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, bd . 3, eds Adam 
Wandruszka & Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Öster. Akad der Wissenschaften 1975), pp. 801-838, p. 814. 
44 Oskar Lobmeyr-Hohenleiten, “Steiermark, Kärnten, Krain,” in Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten 
Österreich, ed. Karl Hugelmann (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller 1934), pp. 459-544, pp. 513, 542. 
23 
travel to different parts of the Monarchy and beyond to seek work; some Slovenes even 
worked in the mines in Westphalia.
45
  On the other hand, significant capital was invested 
in building the infrastructure in Slovene towns, particularly in the area of Ljubljana.
46
  
While I have not found any figures as to how many (if any) Slovene laborers were 
employed in these efforts, the local population did benefit from these improvements.  In 
addition, Slovenes benefited from the Semmering Railway, running from Vienna through 
Ljubljana and terminating at Trieste.  Completed with state funding in 1853, the railway 
boosted industry and commerce between the Slovene areas and the northern parts of the 
Monarchy.
47
 
The province of Dalmatia at the dawn of the twentieth century has often been 
perceived as having been economically backward, and underdeveloped compared to the 
rest of the Monarchy.  Historians have long pointed to the economic problems of 
Dalmatia as evidence of Austria's inattention to South Slav nationality issues, beginning 
with Oscar Jászi's characterization of the province as the “Cinderella of the monarchy.”48  
There is, however, evidence that the Vienna government placed a great deal of effort and 
capital into the local economy.  Around 1905 considerable discussion was given to the 
idea of constructing a railway connecting Dalmatia with the rest of the Monarchy.  The 
stated reasons for the project were the need to encourage the province's economic and 
cultural development; however, the military applications of the project (as it would 
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facilitate troop movements) were not forgotten.
49
  Although the railway connection 
ultimately was not built, the evidence indicates that the Austrian government recognized 
the need for the project.  Robert Kann in particular placed the blame for the failure of this 
enterprise on Magyar opposition, as such a railway would have crossed Hungarian 
territory.
50
  In addition, in 1904 the Joint Ministerial council debated at length the renewal 
of a trade treaty with Italy, in part over the clause limiting imports of Italian wines.
51
   
This was clearly a protectionist move, as the importation of Italian wines since the 
previous trade treaty of 1891 had been damaging to the native Dalmatian winemakers.
52
   
For many of the same strategic reasons, effort was invested in improving 
economic conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In many respects, the provinces were 
economically linked to Dalmatia, as Dalmatia provided its access to the Adriatic.  At the 
time that Austria-Hungary occupied the provinces in 1878, the local economy still 
operated largely according to the traditional Turkish land tenure system that had been in 
place for centuries, including remnants of serfdom.
53
  In the years immediately following, 
administrators mostly left the Ottoman social economic structure intact in the hopes of 
gaining favor with the local Muslim aristocracy, and only gradually began to dismantle 
                                                 
49 Somogyi, Éva, ed., Die Protokolle des Gemeinsamen Ministerrates der Osterreicish-Ungarischen 
Monarchie 1896-1907 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1991), p. 491. 
50 Kann, Multinational Empire, v. 1, pp. 237, 419 
51 Somogyi, p. 408. 
52 Mirjana Gross, “Über die Nationale Frage in Kroatien während der Krise des Dualismus,” in Die 
Nationale Frage in der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie 1900-1918, eds. Péter Hanák & Zoltán 
Szász (Budapest: Verlag Ung. Akad. Der Wissenschaften 1966), pp. 217-231, p. 219. 
53 The Ottoman form of serfdom, the ҫiftlik, differed significantly from its European counterpart in that 
peasants were not the property of the landlord, nor were they legally tied to the land.  Nonetheless, the 
lord had ownership of the peasants' homes, land and tools, and peasants were often compelled to remain 
on the land as they were indebted to their lord.  See Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman 
Rule, 1354-1804 (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1977), pp. 219-221. 
25 
the institution of serfdom, a process still incomplete at the outbreak of war in 1914.
54
  But 
in other ways Bosnia was brought into line with the rest of the monarchy, efforts that 
accelerated following annexation in 1908.  We have already seen the attention given to 
the economy by the Bosnian assembly; prior to the annexation, at a 1896 Joint Ministerial 
council meeting, the principle was laid out that the governments of both halves of the 
Monarchy would take part in providing the budget for the Bosnian administration.
55
    
The 1868 Compromise document between Hungary and Croatia, the Nagodba, 
goes into its greatest level of detail not in regards to issues of administration and 
representation, but rather in terms of finance and economy.  The document spells out in 
minute detail the amount of money Croatia is to be allocated for its annual internal 
administration, how much it is to be allowed in taxation, and how its debts are to be 
managed.
56
  While it does place some responsibility on the senior partner, the Hungarian 
government, much of the onus for ensuring financial success is placed on the Croatian 
Sabor.  For this reason, it has been said that with the ratification of the Nagodba, Croatia 
lost its financial independence.
57
  In an 1884 interview with a representative of Crown 
Prince Rudolf, a representative of the Croatian Party of Right complained bitterly of  
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economic oppression by the Magyars, including the diversion of Croatian tax revenue to 
projects primarily benefiting Magyars, and the suppression of the Croatian wine trade.
58
   
In the Serbian area of the Vojvodina, the province's economic development in the 
post-Ausgleich years proceeded at a slow but steady pace; however, observers such as 
Wayne Vucinich have charged that following the restoration of the province to Hungarian 
rule after 1860, the central government virtually ignored its development except to 
discourage Serbian national movements.
59
  On the other hand, it was also the case that the 
province had been connected by rail to Budapest since the 1860s; the Vojvodina has been 
called the “center of Serbian economic, political, and cultural life;” its middle class was 
larger and more prosperous relative to their conationals in the neighboring state of 
Serbia.
60
   
A final point to make regarding economic issues: in many ways, the entirety of the 
Habsburg Monarchy functioned well as an economic unit, with more industrialized areas 
(e.g., Bohemia) complementing more agrarian ones (such as eastern Hungary).  As Philip 
Longworth argues in his survey of eastern Europe, the consequences of the breaking of 
this unit into separate states proved to be disastrous, and contributed to the economic 
turmoil of the interwar period.
61
  We will return to this point later. 
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Attitudes of the Rulers 
 
A major component of the South Slav nationality policy for both Austria and 
Hungary was the viewpoint and actions of the rulers and administrators in office in both 
parts of the Monarchy during this period.  The rulers of the state were by no means 
unaware of the severity of the nationality problem; writing in 1907, Otto Bauer, head of 
the Social Democratic party, referred to it as the most important problem facing the state's 
domestic politics.
62
   
The monarch himself, Franz Joseph, was not known for having any particular 
sensitivity regarding the nationality issues of his realm (although in a study of the issue, 
William Jenks does suggest that his support of the 1907 electoral reform may have been 
motivated by a desire to exchange national conflict for class conflict – if true signaling at 
least a desire on the monarch's part to alleviate the national tensions of the empire).
63
  His 
son, Crown Prince Rudolf, however, has been remembered by history largely for his 
desire to push through liberal reforms, particularly regarding the nationality problem.  
Several years before his untimely death the Crown Prince famously commissioned the 
multi-volume series Die österreichish-ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild (The 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in Word and Image), an encyclopedic compendium of 
information about each of the provinces of the Monarchy with detailed information about 
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the customs of the local population.  Rudolf revealed something of his mindset toward 
the nationality issue in his introduction to the work: 
The study of the peoples living within the borders of the Monarchy is not a 
topic limited to specialized scholarly research, but rather has practical worth 
for the elevation of a general love for the Fatherland.  Through the increasing 
familiarity with the advantages and peculiarities of the individual ethnic 
groups and their mutual and material dependence on one another, the feeling 
of solidarity that should connect all of the peoples of our Fatherland will be 
substantially strengthened.
64
 
 
In addition, Rudolf demonstrated a particular concern for the struggle of the Croats 
against Magyar pressure.  In the aftermath of riots and constitutional struggles in Zagreb 
in 1883, Rudolf, highly skeptical of the official reports coming from Budapest, sent a 
representative to investigate the situation and provide a detailed report on the Croat 
question.
65
  But Rudolf's labors should not necessarily be considered as representative of 
the nationality policy of the court in general.  Differences with his father resulted in the 
Crown Prince being for the most part politically marginalized, and he himself did not live 
to ascend to the throne.  In addition, Rudolf's views were more tempered by his dynastic 
mindset than is commonly known.  He regarded the Slovene nationality as having been 
largely invented by the Taaffe ministry.
66 
 Although cognizant of Magyar treatment of the 
nationalities, he still wished to maintain the territorial integrity of the Hungarian 
kingdom.
67
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Perhaps the most celebrated figure in this respect is the person of the ultimate heir 
apparent, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.  Much has been made of his presumed support 
for a solution to the nationality problem, and many South Slav nationalists pinned their 
hopes on him.  For example, his name has long come to be associated with support for 
the so-called “trialist” reform – the proposed replacement of the dualist system with the 
inclusion of a third entity, supposedly a South Slav autonomous state.
68
  It was known 
that some in his circle gave support to reforms addressing the nationality issue, such as 
the Romanian politician Aurel Popovici, who in his work Die Vereinigten Staaten von 
Groß-Österreich, argued for the federalization of the Monarchy.
69
  In addition, Franz 
Ferdinand himself was not above using his partisans to give the impression that he 
backed the trialist plan, both in order to gain support among the South Slavs and to 
intimidate the Magyars; his auxiliaries were active in Croatian political circles during the 
first years of the twentieth century.
70
  From these facts has grown the belief that, at the 
least, the Archduke was planning a drastic reorganization of the Monarchy, aided in part 
by the postwar release by one of his circle of a purported manifesto by which the 
Archduke planned to implement a federal reconstitution of the empire.  Although short on 
specifics, the manifesto itself reads with a sense of optimism of resolving the nationality 
problem: 
The peoples of the Danube Monarchy are in a thousand ways bound together 
by historical development, common education and culture, and economic 
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interests.  They should unite in brotherly love, strong together with 
separations eliminated, and only in the areas of cultural and economic 
progress differentiated from each other.  In a spirit of mutual confidence We 
call all who have in heart the prosperity of our God-blessed Fatherland to 
unite their work with Ours!  Only with the dedicated cooperation of all of Our 
peoples will the well-being of each individual part be assured and promoted.
71
 
 
There are, however, several important things to consider about Franz Ferdinand 
that give us pause in this respect.  First, he was above all a dynast with a remarkably 
conservative mindset, and would not have done anything to lessen the prestige of the 
Habsburg inheritance.
72
  In addition, in large part he was motivated by the desire to 
elevate the status of the crown and to reduce the role of the Magyars; if that meant 
removing some of their subject nationalities from Magyar jurisdiction, so be it.
73
  
Therefore, if a “trialist” South Slav state was to emerge from Franz Ferdinand's reign, it 
would almost certainly have been composed of the lands taken exclusively from the 
Hungarian half of the Monarchy; Austria's South Slavs would remain under Vienna's 
administration.  Likewise, in an overview of the Slovene position in the Monarchy, Fran 
Zwitter expresses the view that Franz Ferdinand would never have permitted the 
incorporation of the Slovene areas into an additional autonomous entity of his realm.
74
 
Outside the ruling family, the next most powerful person in Cisleithanian Austria 
was the prime minister (or, to use the proper title, minister-president).  During the post-
Ausgleich years, this position was filled by a succession of individuals, most of whom 
served a relatively short time in office.  Of these, the most notable are Eduard von Taaffe 
(1879-1893) who pushed for electoral reform with mixed success, Ernst von Koerber 
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(1900-1904) who sought to improve economic conditions for the whole of Cisleithanian 
Austria (but gave less attention to nationality issues), and Max Wladimir von Beck 
(1906-1908), who presided over the 1907 Austrian electoral reform. 
The Taaffe ministry deserves particular mention, due both to its relatively long 
term in office, as well as the perception that it did a great deal to expand Slavic 
participation in Austrian government, to the extent that Taaffe has been referred to as a 
“Slavophile.”75  Among Taaffe's achievements was an 1882 electoral reform that reduced 
the size of the tax base required in order to vote.  Taaffe's ministry has come to be known 
as the “iron ring” based on the belief that its goal was to encircle and ultimately smother 
German dominance in Austria; in reality, his policy was one of “muddling through” - 
getting along day-to-day, making small, piecemeal concessions to placate the nationalities 
when necessary, making no major changes.
76
  Indeed, it was a second, much more 
comprehensive, attempt at franchise reform in 1893 that has been regarded as the catalyst  
for the Taaffe ministry's fall from power, as German centralists viewed the bill as a 
preamble to federalization of the Monarchy.
77
   
In a very real sense, Taaffe's “muddling through” approach is also characteristic of 
the South Slav nationality policy of Cisleithanian Austria throughout the post-Ausgleich 
period.  With the exception of the 1907 electoral reform, no major changes occurred in 
the balance of power in the years leading up to the war.  Instead, the government 
contented itself with gradual half-measures, incrementally expanding the franchise, and  
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gradual liberalization of the language laws.  For the South Slavs, there was to be no bold 
experiments in self-government similar to those attempted in Moravia and Galicia. 
Ernst von Koerber, on the other hand, believed that the economic concerns of 
Cisleithania transcended the national issue, and was confident that improvements in the 
economic situation would naturally foster improvements in the political and national 
scene.
78
  While the state as a whole benefited from these reforms, Koerber largely 
overestimated the influence of economics on the nationality issue.  
Max Wladmir von Beck was, in the words of Robert Kann, “one of the ablest 
Austrian statesmen and one of the very few who was supported by a parliamentary, as 
well as a truly popular, majority.”79  Yet his active role was limited to presiding over the 
franchise reform, and he was forced to resign in 1908.  When this happened, the South 
Slavs lost a potential ally.  When a discussion in the Reichsrat occurred over the 
possibility of uniting Dalmatia with Croatia (an outcome desired by Croats but usually 
opposed by the government as it involved transferring Austrian territory to the Hungarian 
crown), Beck reserved his support, but argued that the authority to make this change did 
rest with the Reichsrat.
80
  In addition, he opposed the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
on the grounds that the provinces were not worth the risk of war or of driving the South 
Slavs further into the Russian orbit.
81
  Such a stance was likely appealing to many of the 
Serbs of the Monarchy. 
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On the other side of the dualist border, the office of prime minister for the 
Hungarian lands was slightly more stable.  For a number of years following the 
Ausgleich, the role was filled by Kalman Tisza (1875-1890).  In the early years of the 
twentieth century, Count Istvan Tisza (son of Kalman) served several times as prime 
minister (1903-1905, 1913-1917), and was serving in this capacity for the majority of the 
wartime period. 
Kalman Tisza attempted to give at least the illusion of equality among the 
nationalities (in accordance with the law of 1868) yet did nothing to risk the Magyar 
character of the kingdom and Magyar political dominance.  When in 1875 Mihailo Polit 
stated his view that Hungary was “not a national state but a state of nationalities,” Tisza 
threatened him with political repercussions if he continued to advocate this “illegal 
view.”82  Tisza's administration continued to pursue magyarization measures, such as the 
law of 1879 and a similar one applying to middle schools in 1883.  During this period, no 
consideration was given to any amendment to the 1874 electoral law, which allowed only 
minimal suffrage to non-Magyar nationalities. 
His son Istvan Tisza pursued a similar course.  We have already seen how the 
younger Tisza defeated wartime efforts to extend the franchise; he was also instrumental 
in the failure to implement the 1905 and 1913 electoral reform laws. 
Here we can see a difference between how the nationality policy played out on 
both sides of the dualist border.  Taaffe and Beck supported electoral reform as they 
realized it could ultimately work to the benefit of the Habsburg dynasty.  Both Tiszas, 
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father and son, led the fight against extending the franchise particularly to keep it out of 
the hands of additional non-Magyars. Regarding other nationality rights, the Austrian 
prime ministers followed a general pattern of allowing small, limited concessions on an 
as needed basis in an attempt to conciliate the national groups; by contrast, the prime 
ministers of Hungary generally treated the idea of Magyar dominance of the state as 
paramount, and actively attempted to discourage assertions of non-Magyar national 
rights. 
The position of Ban (Governor) of Croatia was an important one, and the one who 
held it had access to near absolute rule of the territory.  While officially appointed by the 
Emperor-King, in practice the office was filled by the Hungarian government, and was 
expected to further Magyar interests.  A survey of the individuals who held the office 
during this period demonstrates that for the most part, they concerned themselves with 
advancing Magyar interests than protecting those of Croatia.  The Magyar attitude toward 
Croatia is apparent in a 1911 statement by Istvan Tisza: “The Croatian Sabor is no 
parliament; the Ban owes nothing to it, but is responsible solely to the Hungarian 
Minister-President.”83 
As Ban, Ivan Mazuranic (1873-1880) introduced landmark reforms to Croatia, 
including laws granting freedom of the press and freedom of political assembly, and 
improvements to the educational system.
84
  Unfortunately for the Croatian people, this 
kind of stewardship turned out to be an anomaly, and different from the course his 
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successors followed.  Ban Count Karoly Khuen-Héderváry (1883-1903) was a cousin of 
Kalman Tisza, and would rule Croatia, in the words of Rudolf Kiszling, “entirely 
according to Budapest's wishes.”85  His rule is remembered as having been particularly 
hostile to Croatian and South Slav national aspirations.  In the course of an interview with 
Crown Prince Rudolf's representative shortly after assuming office, Khuen-Héderváry 
revealed a deep distrust of Croatian politicians, particularly those of the Party of Right, as 
well as skepticism that he would be able to work cooperatively with the Sabor.
86
  In his 
testament, Stjepan Radić, the founder of the Croatian Peasant Party, relates several 
incidents in which he was imprisoned for having made statements protesting Khuen-
Héderváry's government; however, he does recall at least one occasion on which the Ban 
personally intervened on his behalf.
87
   
The administration of Khuen-Héderváry was also noted for its active attempts to 
incite animosity between Croats and Serbs, a policy that continued in Croatia until the 
end of the empire.  During the two decades of his administration, the Serbs of Croatia 
were given preferential treatment over the Croats; although some of this has been 
attributed as a response to the conciliatory stance of the Kingdom of Serbia toward the 
Monarchy, this “divide and rule” strategy was used to great advantage by Khuen-
Héderváry as a cover to implement magyarization policies with diluted resistance.
88
  
Once given a push by the Ban, this ethnic conflict proved difficult to contain (as it has 
been ever since).  Stjepan Radić relates how, as a university student, he found it necessary 
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to organize a movement to counter demonstrations against a Serbophile professor.
89
  
Croatian Serbs returned these challenges: the appearance of an anti-Croat article in 1902 
contributed to the outbreak of violent, bloody anti-Serb riots in Zagreb.
90
 
Khuen-Héderváry's successors were largely in the same vein, and approached the 
position from a similar perspective.  Pavao Rauch (1908-1910) ruled in an authoritarian 
fashion, and his administration is notable for having been the setting for the Friedjung 
treason trials, which will be discussed in detail shortly.  This state of affairs continued 
under the next two officeholders, Nikola Tomasic (1910-1912) and Slavko Cuvaj (1912-
1913).  In the interim, Croatian resistance to Magyar rule intensified, and Cuvaj was the 
target of assassination attempts by radical Croatian nationalists. 
The years leading up to the outbreak of the war saw increasingly authoritarian rule 
in Croatia.  The Sabor was dissolved in 1909, and did not meet again until 1913.  In the 
interim, the Magyar-appointed administrators were given even wider authority to 
implement policies favorable to Budapest. 
 
The Friedjung trial / The “Agramer Hochverratsprozess” 
In the aftermath of the Bosnian annexation crisis, ostensibly prompted by a fear of 
Serbian revanchism (as will be discussed shortly), the government of the Croatian Ban 
determined to identify possible conspirators and traitors against the crown.  Several 
Serbian and Croatian politicians were charged with treason and put on trial.  The incident 
is sometimes referred to as the Friedjung trial, because of the involvement of historian 
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Heinrich Friedjung in providing documentary evidence of treasonous activity by the 
accused (these documents were later determined to be forgeries).
91
  But the true objective 
of what has also become known as the Agramer Hochverratsprozess (Zagreb High 
Treason Process) was to drive a wedge between the Croat and Serb political parties in 
Croatia by exploiting, among others, their differences regarding the policy toward 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
92
  Ultimately, all of the accused parties were acquitted.  Rather than 
drive Croats and Serbs further apart, the incident had the effect of bringing the two sides 
closer together, accelerating the trend toward cooperation against both Budapest and 
Vienna.  Writing shortly after these events took place, Thomas Masaryk could already see 
this increased solidarity happening.
93
   
Another office figuring prominently during this period is that of the joint Minister 
of Finance, responsible for the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This post was 
filled by Benjamin von Kállay from 1882 until his death in 1903.  Like some of his 
colleagues elsewhere in the Monarchy, Kállay adopted a “divide and rule” strategy 
toward the provinces.  He is credited with having to a large degree encouraged the 
development of the Bosnian Muslims (or Bošnjak) as a distinct nationality, in large part 
to create dissension between them and the Serb and Croat inhabitants, but also with the 
hope that the “new” nationality would be more loyal to the Monarchy.94  This policy did 
not result in a strong bulwark against Serbian irredentism, but it did log some minor 
success; Josef Redlich, a representative in the Reichsrat (and later Austrian Minister of 
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Finance), reported having met with the leader of a party of “government-friendly 
Muslims” in 1912.95  While his national policy was not entirely successful, Kállay did set 
the stage for a temporary pacification of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, perhaps at 
the cost of what proved to be decades of ethnic conflict. 
The question may be asked, for the purposes of this study, would Bosnia-
Herzegovina be more closely aligned with Austria or with Hungary with regard to its 
nationality policy?  Taking all of these factors into account, it is my contention that the 
Bosnian territory, while it was economically linked to Dalmatia and thus to Cisleithanian 
Austria, implemented a nationality policy much more similar to that found in Hungary.  
This can be partially ascribed to the fact that the government of the region during the bulk 
of the prewar years was placed in the hands of Magyar administrators (Kállay and 
Burián).  Parallels can be seen with between the treatment of the South Slav population of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and that of Croatia, particularly in relation to the “divide and rule” 
policy.  The evolution of language rights also followed the Hungarian model more closely 
than the Austrian, although in this case the dominant language was German rather than 
Magyar. 
We can see that, even in the character of the rulers and administrators that there is 
a difference in the manner that government dealt with the South Slav nationality issue.  In 
Cisleithanian Austria, government alternated between, on the one hand, attempts at 
reforms that improved the condition of the population, and, on the other, a policy that at 
best could be considered “salutary neglect.”  In Hungary, meanwhile the dominating 
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principle was to maintain Magyar supremacy and the kingdom's territorial unity.  Also 
characteristic of the nationality policy in the Hungarian territories was the imposition of 
authoritarian rule, and the practice of playing the nationalities against each other, 
characteristics shared by the administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina; while both of these 
did occur on the other side of the dualist border, they are much less commonly associated 
with Cisleithanian Austria.  
In terms of the rule of the South Slavs, 1903 was a pivotal year.  Three crucial 
events occurred during the course of this year.  First, Count Khuen-Héderváry, who had 
reigned as absolute Ban of Croatia for twenty years, finally left that position (to briefly 
serve as minister-president of Hungary).  For a few years following, Croats saw some 
relaxation of the laws he instituted.  Second, Benjamin von Kállay, who had governed 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, died.  His successor Istvan Burián retreated from some of his hard-
line policies, but has been accused of following “an ingenious zig-zag course” of his 
own.
96
  Third, and perhaps most significant for the long term, King Alexander Obrenović 
of Serbia, who had been considered subservient to the Habsburgs, was assassinated along 
with most of his immediate family.  His replacement on the throne, Peter Karadjordjević, 
was known to be an advocate of the “Greater Serbian” or “Yugoslav” solution to the 
South Slav issue.  As a result, Serbian foreign policy in the years following became 
considerably more hostile to the Monarchy and closer to Russia. 
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Foreign Policy Considerations 
 
An awareness on the part of the Austrian and Hungarian governments of the need 
to preserve the state's internal security and standing with regard to its neighbors also 
figured into the South Slav nationality policy.  As a power with a significant presence in 
the Balkans, the Monarchy was drawn into repeated crises on its southern border, 
including the one that ultimately led to the Great War and its own collapse.      
First, Italian irredentism proved to play a significant role in Austro-Hungarian 
policy considerations regarding the South Slavs during this period.  The Austro-
Hungarian government was well aware of the Italian state's desire to annex the South 
Slav-inhabited coastland areas of Istria and Dalmatia.  So it was not surprising that, upon 
hearing a report of a massing of Italian ships off the coast of Dalmatia in 1905, the joint 
Austro-Hungarian ministerial council determined that it was necessary to increase the 
strength of their own forces in the area to defend against any possible threat.
97
  Likewise, 
when the war began in 1914, discussions almost immediately started regarding the 
possibility of offering Italy territory to entice it to remain neutral.  In August 1914 the 
Joint Ministerial council discussed offering Italy Trentino and parts of Istria (including 
Trieste) to forestall the possibility of Italy joining the war in search of more extensive 
territorial gains.
98
  Fear of this eventuality weighed heavily on some in the Austro-
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Hungarian government; in his April 6, 1915 diary entry, Josef Redlich opined that with 
the entry of Italy into the war, Austria-Hungary would be lost.
99
      
Italian ambitions, however, were a minor irritant in comparison to the threat posed 
by the presence of an independent kingdom of Serbia on the southern frontier of the 
Monarchy, one advancing irredentist claims on Habsburg territory.  As discussed, within a 
few years of the Serbian regime change in 1903, the Monarchy's neighbor progressed 
from being a virtual protectorate to being an active rival for leadership of the South Slav 
peoples.  In a memorandum of February 1907, Foreign Minister Count Alois von 
Aehrenthal, noting that “great Serbian propaganda” was gaining steam in the South Slav 
areas, exhorted his colleagues to resolve the issue (preferably by creating a South Slav 
state within the Monarchy) before Serbia took care of it for them.
100
  In his words, 
Now we that we have come up against these national aspirations, so we should 
therefore create along a new outline a South Slav grouping that, in close 
federation with the Kingdom of Hungary, would secure the influence of the 
Monarchy for the distant future.
101
  
 
The first attempt by the part of Austria-Hungary to deal with rising Serbia, the 
customs war of 1906-1909 (the notorious “Pig War”) proved ultimately to be an 
embarrassment for the Habsburgs, as the Serbs found other markets for the embargoed  
goods.  In addition, Serbia's relations with France and Russia grew closer as a result of 
the affair. 
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The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 had considerable ripple effects on 
the status of the South Slav question in the Monarchy.  Although it had been de facto part 
of the Monarchy's framework (albeit in a separate unit) for some time, its formal 
acquisition gave the Serbs for the first time officially a position of virtual numerical 
parity in population with the Croats (see tables 1 and 2).
102
  From that moment forward, 
many of the South Slav nationalists of the Monarchy began to believe increasingly that 
their future was to be aligned with Belgrade, not with Vienna or Budapest.   
Table 1 – Population of the   Table 2 – Population of the South Slav 
South Slav Territories, c.1910  Territories (excluding Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
Croats..................2,731,000   Croats..............2,297,000 
Serbs....................1,967,000   Serbs................1,142,000 
Slovenes..............1,214,000   Slovenes...........1,214,000 
Bosnian Muslims....612,000 
Source: Paul Robert Magosci, Historical Atlas of Central Europe 
 
On the international front, the move was problematic for the Habsburgs.  The 
annexation had been timed to coincide with the Bulgarian declaration of independence in 
the hopes that the latter event would take the focus away from Bosnia; the maneuver 
failed and the annexation was loudly condemned.
103
  The Austro-Hungarian army was 
prepared to mobilize in response to Serbian calls for war over the issue.  Serbia was only 
restrained from declaring war by Russia, who, still recovering from its losses in the 
Russo-Japanese War, had already given its approval for the annexation.  But Serbia was 
to continue to seek a means of avenging itself for the annexation; in advance of June 28, 
1914, Austro-Hungarian intelligence suspected the Serbian government of ties to 
subversive organizations within the Monarchy such as Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia), 
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members of which ultimately carried out the assassination (to the extent that Austrio-
Hungarian officials have been accused of intentionally failing to warn the Archduke).
104
 
A further consequence of the annexation had the ultimate effect of indirectly 
strengthening Serbia.  In an unsuccessful attempt to blunt the impact of the annexation, 
the Monarchy agreed to evacuate its troops from the neighboring Turkish province of the 
Sanjak of Novi Pazar, which it had occupied at the same time as Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
The return to Turkish control was short-lived; during the Balkan Wars, Serbia was able to 
annex this territory, adding to its power and prestige among the South Slavs. 
 
Impact of the Balkan Wars 
The leadership of both parts of the Monarchy witnessed with trepidation the 
unfolding of events that led to the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913.  The alliance concluded 
between Serbia and Bulgaria in March 1912 (several months later to include Greece) in a 
secret clause provided for the division of the Ottoman European possessions among 
them.  The Balkanbund was arranged in collusion with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Sazonov, who intended for the Balkan region's incorporation into the Russian sphere of 
influence in the event of the disruption of the area's status quo.
105
  The Italian invasion of 
Tripoli, which had begun in September 1911, provided the opportunity to put this plan 
into action, with Turkish forces being occupied in North Africa.  In addition, the Tripoli 
invasion was the occasion for a trial mobilization of Russian forces, and a resulting 
mobilization of Austro-Hungarian troops, as it soon became clear that the Balkanbund, 
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while its primary objective was to annex and partition Ottoman territory, secondarily 
targeted Austria-Hungary. 
Thus with the outbreak of the First Balkan War in October 1912 and the rapid 
collapse of the remnant of Turkish control on the European continent (despite a hastily 
concluded peace with Italy), the Habsburg Monarchy was compelled to intervene to 
ensure that Serbia was not able to grow too powerful occupying the void left behind.  
This necessity was reinforced by subsequent events; while the London Conference ended 
the First Balkan War, the Second Balkan War erupted before the treaty was signed.  The 
“concert of Europe” (as represented in the London Conference) had failed to keep the 
peace; as a result, Austria-Hungary had lost its diplomatic position in the Balkans.  
Therefore, Austria-Hungary became the de facto guarantor of the independence of the 
newly established state of Albania, and threatened to intervene militarily to prevent 
Serbia and Montenegro from annexing Albanian territory; Serbia especially desired this 
gain as it would have given them an outlet to the Adriatic Sea - ironically, this purely 
strategic objective may have worked against Serbia's national aspirations, as the territory 
was not populated by South Slavs nor was it part of the traditional Serbian heartland (as 
in Kosovo).
106
   
On three occasions during the Balkan Wars, the Monarchy was compelled to 
threaten the use of force in response to Serbian and Montenegrin provocation.  The first 
occurred when Serbian troops moved toward the Austro-Hungarian border in December 
1912; the fear of involvement from other Great Powers and doubts about German support 
prevented war on this occasion.  The second occurred when the Monarchy threatened war 
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to compel Montenegro to return the city of Scutari to Albania; the king of Montenegro 
ultimately relented.  The third occasion was in October 1913, when Serbia refused to 
withdraw from Albanian territory it had occupied; once again the threat of war convinced 
Serbia to yield.
107
  However, overshadowing these crises was the question of possible 
Russian involvement.  Russia threatened military involvement in the case of a war 
between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
108
  But Russia at this point was not in a position to 
intervene during the Balkan Wars, and Sazonov persuaded the Serbs to back down and 
abandon the Albanian territory, promising Russian support in the future.
109
  This factor 
was key, as the Austro-Hungarian government followed the same pattern of threatening 
military force during the July Crisis, (anticipating that the strategy which seemed to be 
successful during the Balkan Wars would work again during the July Crisis) but on the 
later occasion, Russia no longer had the ability to remain out of the conflict; it had failed 
to support its Serbian allies too often, and Russian influence in the Balkans would have 
been irreparably damaged had Russia backed down then.  
Although it was denied its prize of access to the Adriatic, the Kingdom of Serbia 
emerged from the Balkan Wars with its territory doubled in size (including the formerly 
Habsburg-occupied territory of Novi Pazar), and with its prestige among the South Slav 
peoples enhanced even further.  Therefore the possibility loomed even larger of the 
Serbian state playing the “Piedmont” role, and implementing a Yugoslav solution outside 
the framework of the Monarchy.  The voices of those who had been sounding the alarm 
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about this possibility, such as Conrad, grew even louder.  In a 1913 memorandum, 
Conrad advanced the view that Austria-Hungary's future security could only be 
guaranteed by the incorporation of Serbia and Montenegro into the Monarchy.
110
  Such an 
outcome could only be achieved through war, as in Conrad's words, “the time when 
friendly cooperation with Serbia was possible is over... the same holds for Montenegro, 
whose king has no choice but to act in a Great Serbian spirit.”111  Count Leopold 
Berchtold, Aehrenthal's successor as Foreign Minister, preferred a diplomatic solution but 
was eventually convinced of the necessity of military action, particularly following 
Serbian aggression in the Second Balkan War.
112
  Berchtold's foreign policy had been 
effectively destroyed by the events of the Balkan Wars.  More and more the Austro-
Hungarian foreign ministry concluded that something had to be done about Serbia in 
order for the Monarchy to retain its great power status.  But as Austria-Hungary would 
not have been able to fight Russia alone, assistance from Germany was required (this 
assistance ultimately materialized in the form of the notorious “blank check” during the 
July Crisis).  The promise of German assistance was also needed to overcome the 
opposition of Istvan Tisza to the Monarchy's Balkan policy; Tisza believed that 
Romanian territorial ambitions in Transylvania posed a greater threat to Hungary than 
Serbia.
113
  In the early part of 1914 a memorandum outlining an aggressive Balkan policy 
was commissioned, to include as a guiding principle the attempt to build an anti-Serbian 
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coalition among the Balkan states and to isolate Serbia as far as possible.
114
  This 
document, known as the Matscheko Memorandum, was completed just days before the 
assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife.   
In the aftermath of the assassinations in Sarajevo, the pressure to subdue Serbia 
once and for all grew too great to ignore.  The Monarchy had been embarrassed twice 
before in dealing with Serbia (during the Pig War and in the Balkan Wars) it could not 
afford to be caught off guard again.  There was a palpable sense that the Monarchy had 
lost control of the situation; Berchtold's more restrained inclinations had failed, and 
Conrad's more belligerent policy ruled the day.  Ironically, Franz Ferdinand had been one 
of the major voices advocating against war, and had he survived, it is likely war would 
have been prevented again.
115
  The death of Franz Ferdinand resulting in Berchtold 
gravitating even more closely to Conrad's more aggressive stance.  Viewed in this 
context, the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia represented a final attempt to retain 
the Monarchy's great power status and some influence in the Balkans.  The Serbian 
government was presented with a ten-point list of demands, to be accepted 
unconditionally within 48 hours.  Included in them was the demand for involvement by 
Austro-Hungarian authorities in the suppression of anti-Habsburg subversive 
organizations in Serbia, a demand that was not expected to be accepted.
116
  By presenting 
Serbia with a demand designed to be rejected, the Monarchy effectively provoked the war 
that some, such as Conrad (and to a much lesser extent, Berchtold) believed was 
necessary to end the threat posed by Serbian irredentism.  Ironically, they were following 
                                                 
114 Ibid, v. 1, p. 535. 
115 Ibid, v. 1, p. 434. 
116 Rich, p. 445. 
48 
the same pattern of provocation during the July Crisis as they had during the Bosnian 
annexation and the Balkan Wars, when the hope had been to engage Serbia without 
involving Russia; the Monarchy wished to keep the war localized as far as possible.  
Unfortunately, when the declaration of war finally came, it was no longer possible to 
keep Russia out of the conflict.  As a result, the Dual Monarchy, to borrow a phrase from 
Robert Kann, “committed suicide out of fear of dying.”117  
 
The Great War and the End of the Monarchy 
The question of the viability of the Habsburg Monarchy absent the war falls 
outside the scope of the present study; suffice it to say that virtually all observers agree 
that the war was the immediate cause of the empire's collapse.  However, for most of the 
war, the Allies had no intention of allowing the Monarchy to be partitioned; as late as 
January 1918, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George expressed his support for 
keeping the state intact.
118
  It was only in April 1918, when Kaiser Karl I submitted his 
forces to Wilhelm II's leadership at the Spa Conference (in response to the revelation of 
the Sixtus Affair in which Austria-Hungary attempted to make a separate peace with the  
Allies) that the Allies concluded that the Monarchy was lost to German domination, and 
no longer desired to preserve it.
119
 
During the course of the war, it became increasingly apparent that if the 
Monarchy was to have any hope of surviving in postwar Europe, a satisfactory solution to 
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at least the South Slav nationality problem would have to be found.  However, it was not 
until October 2, 1918, at what turned out to be the penultimate meeting of the Joint 
Ministerial council, that the desirability of establishing a separate political unit (in a form 
approximating a trialist framework) for the South Slavs was considered.
120
  The final 
attempt to address Habsburg Monarchy's nationality issue was Karl I's October 16, 1918, 
decree ordering the federalization of the lands of Cisleithanian Austria; even at this late 
date the Hungarian government refused to allow any such changes to its constitutional 
framework.
121
  Had these measures been implemented under different circumstances 
(e.g., earlier in the war), they may well have saved the Monarchy.  As it was, the gestures 
were far too little and far too late to have any effect on the loyalty of the South Slavs.  
The Allies ignored these belated half-measures, and instead gave their support to the 
Yugoslav National Committee, representatives of which were at that time preparing to 
detach the South Slav territories to be united with Serbia into the new Kingdom of the 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
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Conclusions 
 
What general trends can be discerned about the nature of the policy adopted by 
the Vienna and Budapest governments toward the peoples of the South Slav area?  We 
can see certain slight differences between the respective nationality policies of Austria 
and Hungary.  To a large degree, the motivation behind them may have been influenced 
by the process by which the two realms came to be organized.  
The lands of Cisleithanian Austria were composed of a hodegpodge of territories - 
the Austrian duchies (the so-called “hereditary lands”), Bohemia, Galicia, Dalmatia, etc. - 
acquired piecemeal by the Habsburg dynasty over the course of the centuries.  These 
territories had different historical situations and established customs, and enjoyed a 
variety of traditional privileges.  As such, the main force unifying them was the House of 
Habsburg itself.  In his landmark study The Multinational Empire, Robert Kann discussed 
the role played by German centralism, the desire on the part of the German administrators 
of the monarchy to maintain their position of dominance in the state; this was particularly 
the case as Austrian Germans sought to establish their identity in the wake of Austria's 
defeat by Prussia and expulsion from the German Bund in 1866.
122
   
The Kingdom of Hungary, on the other hand, had achieved its prewar borders at a 
much earlier date (the traditional boundaries of the Lands of St. Stephen had been 
achieved by the sixteenth century, and been solidified following the expulsion of the 
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Turks in the late seventeenth/early eighteenth centuries), and all of its territory had long 
been held (at least in the eyes of the dominant Magyars) as an indivisible part of the 
inheritance of the Holy Crown of St. Stephen.  On the part of the ruling Magyars, there 
was also a feeling of paternalism toward their subject nationalities; however, it 
manifested in a different way.  Here, there was a tendency to make no distinction between 
the Magyar nationality and the boundaries of the kingdom.  In effect, the non-Magyar 
nationalities were regarded as “Magyars of another tongue,” and efforts to encourage 
them to assimilate were based on this premise.
123
  This much was apparent in the text of 
the 1868 Nationalities Law, which declared that Hungary was a “unitary national 
state.”124  To be sure, there were those Magyar politicians who saw the need for national 
reform; Lajos Mocsáry, a Magyar representing a Romanian constituency, believed that 
long-term stability for the Hungarian state could only be achieved by assuring the full 
national development of each of its ethnic groups.
125
  But this view was more the 
exception than the rule, as Mocsáry's efforts faced opposition from Kalman Tisza and 
eventually from his own party.
126
 
From these two disparate starting points, we can see two different nationality 
policies that resulted.  In Cisleithanian Austria during the prewar decades, save for a 
vague idea in some quarters that the German element should be dominant, there was no 
clear nationality policy, and the government generally struggled with issues on a case by 
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case basis (essentially a version of Taaffe's “muddling through” policy).  Within the 
Kingdom of Hungary, on the other hand, assimilation was strongly encouraged 
throughout this period.  The nationalities might continue to use their languages in their 
own communities, but they were encouraged to learn Magyar and use it in official 
settings, and they were not to expect any kind of special treatment or an autonomous 
national existence.  Even in the rare instance in which a concession was made on this last 
point (as in Croatia), steps were taken to ensure that the provincial administration was to 
serve Budapest's interests, not the nationalities, and the population was not to be free of 
the pressure of magyarization.  Taking this into account, one can see the reasoning behind 
the statement that “the King of Hungary governed differently from the Emperor of 
Austria.”127   
What does this specifically say about the situation of the South Slavs of the 
Monarchy?  Consider briefly for a moment the position the South Slav peoples found 
themselves in as their respective national movements gained momentum.  They were a 
group of people who had enough in common that the idea of being joined together in one 
state found a number of supporters (leading to the formation of the Yugoslav state in the 
aftermath of the war), yet the cultural differences between the ethnic groups ultimately 
led to the failure of this attempt.  While most of these differences predated Habsburg rule, 
some proved to be enhanced by the simple factor of where in the Monarchy the group 
resided.  For example, we know of the tragic legacy of government attempts to instigate 
ethnic strife between Serbs and Croats.  While this action occurred in other South Slav 
provinces, it was considerably more pronounced in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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The legacy of Austrian and Hungarian rule was fated to influence the course of the 
post-1918 history of the South Slav territories in a myriad of other ways.  As we have 
seen, during the prewar years, Cisleithanian Austria made several, albeit imperfect, 
strides toward democratic reform that brought the nationalities into the system to a 
greater degree; Hungary resisted any such change and kept participation by the 
nationalities marginalized.  As a result of this prewar experience, the nationalities of 
Austria entered into the post-1918 period in general more prepared than those of Hungary 
to handle the demands of representative government they faced as part of their new 
states, a connection that has not been lost on historians such as Rudolf Sieghart and 
Robert Kann.
128
  The Austrian government, in large part unintentionally, laid the 
groundwork for much of the future success of their South Slav population.  The Magyars, 
by contrast, have been regarded, both by contemporary and later observers, as “the mortal 
enemy of the South Slavs and their unification efforts.”129   
Although the Slovenes were largely on the sidelines in the struggle between Serbs 
and Croats for supremacy in the new Yugoslav state (until 1929, officially, the “Kingdom 
of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes”), their prior experience learning to conduct business 
with the dominant Germans in the Reichsrat served them well in their later experience; 
being skilled in local government and administration they were able to maneuver to gain 
some concessions in the Serb-dominated state.
130
  The Croats, on the other hand, 
according to Joseph Rothschild, had emerged from the imperial period with a 
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considerable degree of distrust toward the idea of adhering to a central government.
131
   
But it might be more clear to state that in interwar Yugoslavia, the Croats occupied an 
analogous position to the one they had in prewar Hungary; they had merely exchanged 
one dominant power (the Magyars) for another (the Serbs).  It is also significant to note 
that there was a difference between the Serbs that had lived in the Monarchy prior to the 
war (prečani) and those who had lived in the prewar Kingdom of Serbia (srbijanci).  The 
prečani Serbs ultimately chose to side with the Croats and Slovenes over their 
conationals in the ethnic strife during the interwar period.
132
  The prečani Serbs had two 
major centers of population; the Vojvodina and Dalmatia.  As we have seen, in both of 
these areas significant capital was invested in building the local infrastructure, and 
Serbian economic and cultural life in these provinces, although behind the standards of 
the rest of the Monarchy, was considered superior to that experienced in the prewar 
Serbian kingdom.  Recall also the economic problems caused by the breakup of the 
Habsburg Monarchy; a similar dynamic can be discerned in post-1918 Yugoslavia.  Here, 
the more industrialized north (Slovenia and parts of Croatia) were expected to subsidize 
the less developed southern regions.
133
  Friction over this imbalance plagued the 
Yugoslav state through much of its existence, and contributed to its final breakup in 
1991-2. 
The influence of the Austrian and Hungarian governments on the South Slav 
territories can be discerned even into the period of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the 
ensuing wars in the early 1990s.  We have already touched on the most obvious example: 
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the relations between the Bosnian Muslims and the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, ultimately leading to the 1992-1995 war, and the fragile peace that exists 
today.  This influence can also be seen in other, more subtle ways.  Slovenia was able to 
break away from Yugoslavia with very little conflict in 1991, and largely remained 
detached from the chaos of the wars that have embroiled its former Yugoslav partners.
134
  
While Slovenia owes much of its external security to its geographical position (with 
Croatia acting as a buffer separating it from the rest of the former Yugoslavia), it may not 
be too much of a stretch to argue that the state's internal stability and prosperity in the 
following years can be at least in part attributed to its advanced political and economic 
development from the Habsburg era onward.  Croatia, on the other hand, endured a 
protracted battle for independence against the Serbs of Yugoslavia, with much of its 
territory occupied up to 1995.
135
  One can see parallels in that the occupied territories 
(such as the greater part of Slavonia) were mostly those parts of Croatia that had been in 
the Hungarian part of the Monarchy).  An additional legacy from the years of Hungarian 
rule played out here - many Serbs living in these areas fought with the Serb-led Yugoslav 
armies against their Croat neighbors, and were subsequently expelled when the territories 
were recaptured; the percentage of Serbs constituting Croatia's population fell from 12% 
in 1991 to just 3% in 1995.
136
   It would be a considerable exaggeration to assign primary 
responsibility for the violence of the 1990s to policies pursued by the Habsburg 
Monarchy; indeed, the immediate cause of the collapse of Yugoslavia and resulting wars 
                                                 
134 Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall    
  of Milošević (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2002), p. 176. 
135 Ibid, p. 230. 
136 Ibid, p. 231. 
56 
had much more to do with the ambitions of Slobodan Milsošević, Franjo Tudjman, 
Radovan Karadžić and other individuals concerned with self-aggrandizement and 
imposing their vision on the state.  The argument can be made, however, that the legacy 
of Habsburg rule, particularly in the Hungarian half, laid the groundwork of ethnic 
tension that, along with subsequent events, facilitated the destructive fruits of these 
individuals' labors. 
     In these days, when the prevailing logic is that each ethnic group should ideally have 
its own independent state, the construct known as the multinational state appears 
consigned to the dustbin of history.  It must be remembered, however, that the 
multinational state (whether ruled from Vienna/Budapest, Constantinople, or St. 
Petersburg) served a vital role in maintaining stability (if not necessarily harmony) in 
Central and Eastern Europe prior to 1918.  In a wartime examination of the South Slav 
issue, Leo von Südland stated that if the Monarchy wished to win the peace as well as the 
war it would be necessary to come to terms with the South Slav question, and also 
expressed hope that in the future, such a resolution would be found.
137
  As we know now, 
the resolution to the South Slav nationality problem was not to be found within the 
framework of the Dual Monarchy.  Neither the Austrian nor the Hungarian approach was 
successful over the long term, but these governments still left a lasting stamp on their 
former territories.  For both good and ill, the Habsburg legacy is one the region is still 
today coming to terms with.
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